CRIMINAL LAW
Probable cause

Galanakis v. City of Newton Iowa, No. 24-1275 (8th Cir. April 17, 2025)

The facts: Officers stopped a driver, Tayvin Galanakis, for driving with high beams on. This was purportedly the only reason for the stop as there was no indication of any erratic movement. During the stop, officers noted Galanakis was chewing gum and had air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. They conducted field sobriety tests, during which Galanakis took too many steps on the walk-and-turn portion and did not follow some of the officer’s instructions, such as counting out loud during the one-leg stand test. However, he otherwise performed the tests without issue. The driver asked to take a breathalyzer, which ultimately showed no trace of alcohol. The officer then read Galanakis his Miranda rights and asked if he would submit to a drug test at the station. Galanakis agreed at first but then requested to go home, at which point he was arrested. A drug test eventually showed no evidence of drug use.

The type of case: Galanakis sued the officers for a federal claim for arrest without probable cause. The officers claimed they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions for qualified immunity.

The issues: The Fourth Amendment includes the right to be free from arrest without probable cause. To determine whether probable cause exists, courts look at the events leading to the arrest and whether the historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer amount to probable cause. Even if an actual probable cause is lacking, officers may be shielded if they had “arguable probable cause.” Arguable probable cause exists when an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing the arrest is based in probable cause if the mistake is objectively reasonable. On appeal, the officers claimed they were entitled to immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Galanakis.

The court’s ruling: The Eighth Circuit Court found that arguable probable cause must be based on the totality of circumstances, not isolated behaviors or a “divide-and-conquer” approach to the facts. The defendants argued that some of Galanakis’ actions and statements during the stop would lead an objectively reasonable officer to suspect intoxication. The court, however, looked at the entire interaction and determined that no objectively reasonable officer could have concluded there was a substantial chance Galanakis was intoxicated.

What this means for cities: When determining probable cause to arrest an individual, law enforcement must look at the entire situation. Specific actions may not support probable cause for an arrest when outweighed by other facts.

SECTION 1983
First Amendment

Sorcan v. Rock Ridge School District, 131 F.4th 646 (8th Cir. 2025)

The facts: The Rock Ridge School District scheduled a closed session to discuss the censure of Pollyann Sorcan, a longtime board member, for failing to follow district policies related to rules of order, data privacy laws, and for refusing to work with the negotiation committee on a contract. Sorcan also undermined the district’s mission on social media, and more. At her request, the issue was discussed in an open session of the board. A censure resolution was adopted, removing Sorcan from all committee assignments. The censure was formally lifted 18 months later.

The type of case: Sorcan filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against the district and the board chair in his official capacity, alleging First Amendment retaliation and a violation of her First Amendment rights. She sought nominal damages, attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief to formally rescind the censure, and reinstatement to committees. The district court dismissed the claims.

The issues: The district court found Sorcan’s claim against the chair was barred by legislative immunity, which protects local officials sued in their individual capacities for legislative acts. However, officials sued in their official capacities are not entitled to the same immunity.

The district court also determined that Sorcan failed to state a claim because she had not identified a persistent policy or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by the district. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Section 1983 liability may only be attached if the violations resulted from:

• An official government policy.
• An unofficial custom.
• A deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. The district court ruled that a single censure action did not meet this standard.

The court’s ruling: The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the chair was not entitled to legislative immunity, as the suit was effectively against the district itself, which is not immune.

The Court also ruled that a single decision by authorized policymakers could constitute official government policy regardless of whether the body had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the future. Sorcan’s allegation that the district had an unwritten policy of retaliating against individuals for their protected speech met the threshold under Monell.

The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.

What this means for cities: Cities should be wary when taking actions against fellow council members exercising free speech. City council members retain their First Amendment rights, even if they make comments that reflect poorly on the city.

LAND USE
Conditional use permit

In the Matter of the Application of Dairy Ridge, LLC, for a Conditional Use Permit (A24-0640)(MN App, March 32, 2025) (Nonprecedential)

The facts: Dairy Ridge applied to Todd County for a conditional use permit (CUP) to expand its existing feedlot. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) submitted concerns with groundwater sustainability if the CUP was granted, and the Todd County Planning Commission received a report citing five instances of well interference to neighboring properties, with more well interference expected. While the planning commission recommended approval of the CUP — with several conditions including securing DNR water withdrawal permits — the county board denied the CUP for the following reasons:

• Lack of sufficient DNR data that is needed to make an informed decision about water quantity protections.
• Insufficient availability of groundwater to supply the increased need.
• Inadequate information related to groundwater.
• Concerns for the health, safety, and welfare of county residents.

The type of case: Dairy Ridge challenged the denial arguing the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, claiming that the board’s decision lacked a factual basis. Dairy Ridge also claimed that all conditions of the county’s zoning ordinance had been met.

The issues: When reviewing a CUP denial, courts assess whether the reasons given by the board are legally sufficient. If the reasons are legally sufficient, the court looks at whether they are supported by evidence in the record. The party challenging the decision must prove that the reasons were legally insufficient or not supported by the record.

The court’s ruling: The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the denial, concluding that the board lacked definitive information on the groundwater impacts and could not responsibly impose conditions to satisfy the CUP criteria outlined in the zoning ordinance. The court noted testimony from both the DNR and neighbors showing a lack of clarity as to whether the increased operation would adversely affect groundwater. Therefore, the court upheld the county’s decision.

What this means for cities: When making land use decisions, cities must make a complete record documenting the reasons for their decisions. This is a good reminder that zoning decisions need to be based on facts and the importance of having expert testimony in the record.

Written by Kyle Hartnett, assistant research manager with the League of Minnesota Cities. Contact: [email protected] or (651) 215-4084.